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Toward a Behaviorally Grounded Theory
of Inforrmation Value
Michael E. Treocy
Center for Information Systems Research
Sloan School of Management
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
ABSTRACT
, Economic models of information value have had little impact on the

theory and practice of MIS. This is due in part to difficulties in
operationalizing these models, but more importantly, it is due to

problems in the theory that stem from descriptively invalid assump-

tions.

This paper examines those assumptions and reviews five

major areas for modification: the decision process, human judgment
under uncertainty, the choice of actions, multiple information signal

resolution, and multiple decisions over time. Incorporation of valid

descriptive assumptions in the economic theory wi I I move the field
toward a behaviorally grounded theory of information value.

INTRODUCTION

(1966), Feltham (1968), Mock (1971), and
others have been awkward and unsatisfac-

> The theory of information economics has
had little discernible impact on the theory
and practice of management information
systems design and evaluation, despite
large and obvious overlapping interests.
The economic theory has provided models
of the transmission and communication of
information (Marschak, 1968; Shannon &
Weaver, 1949), and of the value of an information system (Marschak, 1971). It
has provided models of the optimal choice

The major root of the problem with economic information value theory, though, is
not its inoperability, but that it is based

from among available information system

upon invalid and unrealistic assumptions

tory in their results. This has led some to
abandon the unidimensional value model in

favor of multiattribute approaches. King
and Epstein (1976), and Ahituv (1980) have
each presented operational multiattribute

schemes which maintain little of the substance of the economic theory.

components (Marschak, 1971; Mock, 1969),
and of the comparative informativeness of
information systems (Blackwell, 1953).
However, none of these models has had
much influence on MIS.

- Part of the explanation of this unhappy
situation is that the theory is difficult to
operationalize, because theoretical models

of information value require large numbers
of input parameters that are sometimes
impossible to estimate.
Direct applications of the theory by Bedford and Onsi

about decision making and how managers
utilize information. Consider, as an example Blackwell's Theorem ( 1953), probably the best known result of information
economics. The theorem directly implies

that a more disaggregated information
system is always at least as desirable as a
less detailed system (Hilton, 1981). Within
the confines of severe assumptions, such as

unlimited and costless information processing, this result is valid, but in a more
typical managerial setting the validity
vanishes and the entire point is lost. Thus,
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the limited impact of information economics on our field stems from problems in
the theory, rather than in the practice.

In this paper, we shall expand this thesis
and set directions for the development of
information value theory that is founded
upon valid and realistic assumptions about
managerial decision making behavior. We
do not seek simply an operational model of
information value. Our ultimate objective

is to move the economic theory toward

what Keen calls "a behaviorally grounded
conception of optimality that meshes the
analytic perspective of optimization science with descriptive, pluralistic models of

the decision making process, (Keen, 1977).
We start with a review of developments in

the economic theory of information value
and a critical examination of underlying
assumptions about the decision process and

the decision maker. Five major modifica-

tions of the economic theory, suggested by
descriptive models of managerial behavior
found in other fields of study, are discussed

or multiple information systems, and the
decisions can be single or multiple. Figure

I illustrates this diversity and indicates

selected
model.

references

for

each

type

of

Each decision is framed as a problem which

involves the choice of an action from a
predefined set of alternatives. The utility
of any action depends on which state of

nature occurs and the utility of each ac-

tion-state pair is known. The set of states
is predefined, but the decision maker, who

wishes to maximize utility, has only probabilistic knowledge as to which will occur.
Information in the form of single or mui-

tiple signals from single or multiple in-

formation sources is used to refine the
probabi listic knowledge through Bayesian
revision, which requires that the decision
maker have detai led knowledge of the

conditional probability of obtaining each

different signal given any state of nature.
The refined knowledge of states leads to an
increase in the exi ected uti I ity of action.

Finally, this entire approach is

This gain in expected utility is the defini-

lustrates the utility of a behavioral theory

an ex ante measure, made before any signals are received, actions ore chosen, or

in turn.

reviewed in a concluding section that il- -tion of the value of the information. It is
of information value.

ECONOMICS MODELS OF INFORMATION VALUE

states occur.
quantities.

Thus, it deals in expected

L. J. Savage, the originator of the fundamental axioms upon which the information
economics and decision analysis models are
based, wrote that his was, "a highly idealized theory of the behavior of a 'rational'
person with respect to decisions," ( 1954).

> Two distinct schools, one in economics and
another in statistics, have been concerned
with the value of information for more
than twenty-f ive years (Hirshlei fer, 1973).
*- Information economics and statlstical de- Our concern is with the value of information to typical managers, with all their
cision analysis have produced a series of
flaws and imperfections, acting in a more
similar models that value information in
realistic, more complex environment. We
=assumprestrictive
several
of
context
the
tions about the behavior, abi lity, and are attempting to prescribe the variables
that must be considered to produce a valid
knowledge of actors using information.
descriptive model of the value of informa,- The models of information value vary along >tion to typical managers. Such a model
two dimensions: the complexity of the in- must be founded upon a valid description of
the managerial use of information, rather
formation source and the number of decithan upon the sterile, prescriptive assumpThe
information
source
can
be
a
» sions.
tions that define "economic man."
single signal, a single information system,
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Economics Models of Information Value

AREAS OF MODIFICATION

activities which use information can be
classified as some phase of the intelli-

These economics models of information

gence-design-choice-review decision proc-

value poorly describe the roles of information in managerial decision making, and
hence poorly reflect the obtainable value
of information in typical managerial settings.
The descriptive inadequacies of

ess (Simon, 1965). Simon writes:

Decision making comprises four
principle phases: finding occasions
for making a decision, finding possible courses of action, choosing
among courses of action, and evaluating past choices.
These four
activities... account for most of
what executives do," (Simon, 1977).

these models have been organized for discussion into five sections. In each, possible
modifications of the models, as suggested

by a reading of other related fields of

study, are indicated.

Multiple
Information
Sources

We conclude with

some remarks on the di fficulty of implementing such modifications and the efficacy of this approach.

The Decision Process

Mintzberg's study of the work of five chief
executives reinforces this finding (1973).
All but time spent in ceremonial activities
(12%) and in giving information (8%) is

attributable to one or more phases of de-

According to economics models, informa-

cision making.

tion derives value from its effect on the

decision process. This orientation is difficult to fault if decision making is inter-

preted broadly, for almost al I managerial

Witte ( 1972) formally tested for the exis-

tence of different phases in the decision
process using a sample of 233 decisions to

acquire computer equipment.
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He divided

each decision process into ten equal time
periods and characterized each activity in
each period as information gathering, alternatives
development,
alternatives
evaluation, or choice. The evidence sup-

ported the hypothesis that multiple phases
exist within the decision process.
xThe difficulty with the economics models

is that they concentrate upon only one

phase of decision making, the choice
among alternative courses of action. They

assume that an occasion for decision making has been found and that all possible

courses of action and consequences for

every conceivable course of events have
been determined. But, by
assumptions are satisfied,
already used a great deal
and expended the majority

the time these
managers have
of Information
of their effort

on the problem (Simon, 1977). As Edwards
and Roxburgh ( 1977) have noted, decisions

subdecisions, no support for the hypothesis
was found.
Mintzberg, Raisinghani, and Theoret ( 1976)
also found evidence of cycling through
phases during the decision process, in their
study of twenty-five strategic decision

processes in different organizatons. They
suggest that cycling is used as a means of

comprehending and clarifying complex
decision processes, and that "the most
complex and novel strategic decisions seem
to involve the greatest incidence of comprehension cycles," ( 1976).

Evidence was

also found that interrupts, created by

internal and external pressures and by the
appearance of new options, caused cycling.
-The authors build their findings into an
elaboration of the

simple

intelligence-

design-choice model, and posit that intelli-

gence is comprised of two routines: deci-

are profoundly affected by information at --sion recognition and diagnosis. Diagnosis is

the intelligence and design phases of the an optional routine used to clarify and
- decision making process. Without infor- 0-define the issues. Decision recognition

mation to identify problems, structure al-

ternatives, and estimate consequences, no

choice is ever made.
> Economic models of information value
must be expanded to include consideration

of these earlier phases, intelligence and

occurs when there are sufficient signals

about either a crisis, a problem, or an
opportunity. This categorization of problems by stimulus was first suggested by
Carter (1971) in his study of all strategic
decisions within one company. The earlier
theory of Cyert and March ( 1963) suggested that decision recognition was always a
response to problems rather than to perceived opportunities.

design, if they are to accurately reflect
The final
»the benefits of information.
phase, review, need not be explicitly modeled since it is usually part of the intellitheoretical
gence phase of other decisions, and could >-Pounds (1969) has presented a
structure for analyzing problem identifibe captured as such in a multiple decision
cation, one type of decision recognition, as
model.
a process of comparing information about
actual conditions against the predictions of
The phase theory of decision making ima chosen "model" of how things ought to
plies not only that decisions are comprised be. The models managers use are implicit
of different activities, but also that these
or explicit derivations from historical and
activities follow a set pattern, a progres- planning data, or models imposed by othsion from initial recognition to implemeners, or derived from outside the organizatation of the chosen actions. Witte's evition.
dence does not support the hypothesis that
the phases followed a clear progression. >The design phase of decision making is not
well understood. Cyert and March ( 1963)
Even when each decision was divided into

250

Human Judgment Under
Uncertainty

posit that design is largely a matter of
problem-directed search for acceptable
alternative actions.
How this search is

accomplished, though, is somewhat less , There are two competing paradigms of how
than clear.
information is utilized in judgment and
choice, the Bayesian and the regression

> schools of thought.
> Mintzberg, Raisinghani, and Theoret ( 1976)

The essential differ-

ence between the two is in the manner of
assessment of the relationship between in-

suggest that design activity is very differ_ formation and the states about which one
ent depending upon whether the decision =-is drawing inference. The Bayesians promaker sought a ready-made or a custom-

P0se the use of conditional probabi I ities

made solution. They note that search is
appropriate for ready-made solutions, but

and Bayes' theorem to assess the impact of

information upon prior judgments of the
that more elaborate models are necessary =- states' probabi lity of obtaining. The refor the description of the design of cus- gression school, formal ized in the lens
tom-made solutions.
Reitman (964) and
model proposed by Brunswik ( 1952 & 1956),
Alexander (1979) have further detail on the uses correlations of states with information signals to weight the importance of
various forms of design activity.

each information signal in the final judgment. After several hundred psychology

studies of human judgment, the rivalry

In summary, there is general agreement in
the literature that intelligence and design

activities exist as important phases of the
decision process. In addition of some consideration of the intelligence and design
processes to the model should provide a

more accurate evaluation of the manage-

- rial uses of information. The exact nature
of each phase and their order from decision

recognition

to decision implementation

appears to vary among classes of decisions.
.- Therefore it may be necessary to bui Id

specialized information value models, using
the general information economics approach, for different types of decisions or
different roles of management.
For

example, using Pounds' model ( 1969) of the
process of problem finding as a description
of how managers uti I ize information for
problem finding, one could build a model of
the value of information for monitoring.

The general approach to this model would

be the same as in information economics,
but the underlying assumptions about
managerial behavior would be more accu-

rate and would result in more valid, more
useful, and more usable theory.
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between the two schools remains intense.
Despite obvious conceptual overlap, attempts at unifying the two views have met

with limited success (Slavic & Lichtenstein, 1971).
Mock and Vasarhelyi ( 1978) have attempted

to synthesize the lens model of human

information processing with the economic
model of information value. Their con-

ceptual schema suggests that this may be

accomplished simply by substituting the
lens rnodel for the Bayesian model of signal

utilization. Hilton (1980) has taken a different approach toward integrating the two
views in an information value model. He
has absorbed some of the features of human information processing into a Bayesian
view of extending the dimensionality of the
utility function to cover each feature. Of
course, a utility function with enough dimensions can be made to fit any situation.

Thus, the complex resultant formulation is

of dubious value.

Economics has adhered to the Bayesian

view of information utilization ever since
Savage ( 1954) first joined the concepts of

utility and subjective probability into a

estimates ( 1971,1973, & 1974). The "pros-

formal, axiomatic theory of decision mak-

pect theory" they have developed sheds

ing. This is why the economics information

considerable light on how outcomes are

value models require that the decision
maker have knowledge of the prior probabilities of states occurring, p(s), and of the
conditional probablities of each signal,
p(y I s), for the derivation of p(s I y), the
probabi I ities of each state occurring revised upon receipt of signal y. It is a

framed as gains and losses in evaluating

utilities and on the transient nature of

these values (1979 & 1981). A model of
information value needs to include consideration of these systematic biases, for they
induce a systematic subuti lization of information, and decrease the obtainable
value of information.

curious formulation of the decision maker's
problem, for it is a simpler matter to
produce directly subjective estimates of
The Choice of Actions
p(s I y) in the presence of y, than to estimate both p(s) and p(y Is) and apply the
> Economics information value models reBayesian revision formula.

quire that the decision maker explore the

Consider, for a moment, weather forecasts

consequences of every action, from the

and tomorrow's weather conditions. The
forecast is information; it corresponds to

potential action set, in every state of nature. The action is chosen which maximizes the expected value of outcomes.
y. Tomorrow's weather condition, rain or
sun, is the uncertain state. Now think of = There is considerable evidence that actions
your favorite weather forecaster and es- are chosen on a much simpler basis.
timate the probability that rain will be
forecast giyen that it will be sunny tomor- > Simon was one of the first to question the
row, p(y i s). An important di fficulty im- maximum expected value model of choice.
mediately arises. The problem is back- > He developed the well known idea of satisficing, and submitted it as a better dewords to the normal fashion of thinking
about information and states. The proba- scription of individual behavior, and as a
bi lity of sun tomorrow, given a forecast of normative model of rational behavior under
rain, p(s·l y), is a more natural assessment, conditions of costly information gathering
because it is chronologically ordered (first and processing (1955, 1956, 1957, & 1959).
an information signal, then an inference He suggested that an action choice rule
about the state), and i t measures the nat- more descriptive of human behavior would

be to determine a minimum aspiration

ural notion of reliability of information.

This example illustrates the inadequacy of

level, L, for a decision outcome and se-

Bayesian revision as a descriptive theory.

quentially search and test potential actions
unti I an action a' is found such that:

> Reformulation of the model to indicate
direct estimation of p(st y) by the decision
maker simplifies the model formulation,
but further complications must be considered. There is a large and growing body of

MIN u(s,a') > L
s

psychology I iterature that documents and

theorizes on evidence of systematic bias in
- the estimation of probabilities. Tversky

In this formulation, u(s,a') need not be
accurately determined; one only needs to

and Kahneman have identified three important heuristics by which people estimate probabi lities, and have demonstrated

know whether u(s,a') is greater than L, the
level of aspiration. L and u(s,a') could be
multidimensional. Then, the action choice

how these lead to systematic biasing of
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rule need not be modified, but the chosen

action a' must satisfy the rule along every

Different simplified choice rules could also
be modeled. For example, one could model

tive.

sumptions about most likely future scenar-

dimension. This obviates the need for a
tradeoff among dimensions of the objec-

the practice of developing plans upon as-

ios. This is equivalent to identifying the

most likely state of nature and choosing an

> Cyert and March ( 1963) extended this idea
to the theory of the firm, and considerable
work has continued in this area of bounded
Stigler
rational theory (March, 1978).

action to maximize the value of the outcome if that state obtains. The decision

rule would be, chosen a', such that:

( 1961) has explored the economics of the
search activity. Many of these ideas could

u(s',a') = MAX u(s',a)

simplify a model of information value and
serve as a better description of decision
making behavior.

a

where
Soelberg ( 1966 & 1967) studied the behav-

p(s' I y') = MAX p(s y')

ior of fifty-two graduate students making
job decisions.
He found evidence that
individuals had more than one acceptable
choice alternative before ending their

search, in contradiction to strict satisficing behavior. Soelberg developed a theo

ry
of decision making that combines the notions of maximizing along the most impor-

tant one or two dimensions of outcome and
satisficing along all others, to explain his
findings.

The conflict between Simon's and Soel-

S

Clearly, the appro'priate model of action

choice varies among classes of decisions.
, Research has provided some understanding
of when and where different choice strategies ar6 used, but not enough to be able to
construct one integrated model of action
,..choice. Therefore, models of information
value should be specialized to particular
classes of decisions or types of managerial
roles, so that the appropriate action choice

berg's theories of choice behavior can be
resolved using Mintzberg, Raisinghani, and

model may be incorporated.

Theoret's differentiation between ready-

made and custom-made solutions. They
- write, "The hypothesis with the strongest

Multiple Signal Resolution

support in our study is that the organiza- > There is little evidence that individuals
tion designs only one fully-developed cus- resolve multiple and possib
ly conflicting
tom-made solution...In contrast, organiza- signals through a compl
ex Bayesian revi-

tions that chose ready-made solutions typically selected them from among a number
of alternatives," ( 1976). Soelberg's sample

sion process. Even Bayesian psychologists
have developed theories about individuals'
misaggregation of multiple signals to ex-

was of decision makers seeking and choosing from among ready-made .solutions, job
offers, whereas many of Simon's conclusions appear to have germinated from his
observations of problems involving custommade solutions, such as the widely refer-

plain the apparent conservative revision of
prior probability estimates (Beach, 1968;
Edwards, 1968; Gettys & Manley, 1968;
Hilton, 1980; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974;
Wheeler & Beach, 1968).

made in the early 1950's

slightly better description of multiple signal resolution.
Summers ( 1962) and

enced description of a computer acquisi- - The regression paradign
offers only a
tion decision

(Cyert, Simon, Trow, 1956).
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Dudycha and Naylor ( 1966), studied the -The economists appear to have been trying
to model the use of historical information
utilization of orthoganot information signals, and concluded that the lens model .-in decision making. This might be accomplished much more simply if we do not
provided an accurate description of how
distinguish historical information. In this
information
uncorrelated
utilize
individuals
way, the new information signals may emBrunswik
judgments.
signals in forming
body historical information, and the over( 1956) suggested that intercorrelations
wrought complexity of the problem disapamong information signals are the rule
pears.
rather than the exception. His lens model
has been used to evaluate how wei I indiThe other major modification of the muividuals are able to make adjustments for
tiple decision problem has already been
intercorrelations, by comparing an indisuggested in an earlier section. Decision
vidual's weighting of signals with regresproblems cannot be defined and enumersion weights. The evidence indicates that
ated at the beginning of any period of
these adjustments generally are not made
time. They must be discovered, selected,
very well (Armelius & Armelius, 1976;
or assigned with little forewarning. We
&
Hoffmann
1964;
Hayes,
Einhorn, 1971;
have suggested that this problem identifiDudycha,
&
Blanchard, 1961; Schmitt
cation
issue can best be described by add1975).
ing an intelligence phase to the model.
- As with modeling the design phase of the

decision process, the direction to take in

modeling multiple signal resolution is not
clear. Nevertheless, it should be possible
to improve upon the descriptive validity of

the complex Bayesian revision process
adopted by information economics.
Multiple Decisions Over Time

How do managers deal with information
, over time? The economics models assume
that all future decision problems have been
designed at the beginning of a finite time
=:. horizon (Feltham, 1972). In this context,
an information source is valued as the
present value of the expected stream of
outcome improvements gained by a decision maker using information signals op-

timally. The solution to this problem can

only be derived using dynamic programming, for one must consider the impact of
each signal in all future decisions as well

as in the present decision.

It is not the

reuse of the information source, but of the
particular information signals that makes
the structure of the model so absurdly
counter to intuitive notions of managerial
behavior.

CONCLUSIONS
We have examined the standard economic

models of information value and suggested
five major areas of revision that would

move the models toward a behaviorally
grounded theory of information value. Our

suggestions are not radical. These modifications would alter the underlying as-

sumptions about decision making and hu-

processing, without
abandoning the general economic framework of information valuation.
man

information

The review of work in the five major
revision areas reveals that descriptive
theories of decison making and human information processing are not wei I understood. Competing and conflicting theories
abound, each with its own proponents and
its own relevant domain of managerial behavior. This may lead some to be skeptical
of success in bui Iding a revised model and
to retreat to standard economic models,
but there can be no safe refuge in theory

which is bui It upon a weak foundation of
invalid assumptions.
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i

Rather than retreat, what is necessary is

that information theory be constructed for
particular classes of decision making or
managerial action.

Then, one need use

only descriptive theory relevant to that
domain.
The resultant model will not

achieve universal applicabi I ity, but it may

provide the theoretical underpinnings to
the solution of an MIS problem. Specialization should also alleviate some of the
operational difficulties encountered whenever economic models of information value
have been applied. After all, our implementation studies have highlighted the

advantages of tailor-made solutions. It is

time to tailor-make some theory.
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